Which place’s debt rules apply—and who can help?

SettleADebt — S_IA PASS-08

Ordinary consumer-debt limitation, accrual, acknowledgment, payment, and judgment-duration gateway

Fresh research date: October 27, 2026, America/Los_Angeles and UTC. Observed session clock readings: 09:41:15–10:02:56 PDT, corresponding to 16:41:15–17:02:56 UTC. These are observed session readings, not individual source-fetch timestamps.

Scope: Ordinary unsecured consumer obligations and the necessary judgment-duration distinctions. This is a same-coordinator research component, not independent review. P04 and P06 remain unreviewed and supply no premises. Earlier provider-fee, licensing, bond, agreement, and correction findings remain confined to their original scopes.

Principal finding: Iowa does not have one universal “consumer-debt clock.” The ordinary starting periods are five years for unwritten obligations and ten years for written contracts, but classification, accrual, installment maturity, valid acceleration, statutory revival, foreign-law predicates, and procedural preservation must each be established. An ordinary court-of-record money judgment introduces a different twenty-year framework; its statutory real-estate lien ordinarily has a separate ten-year duration. Iowa Legislature+2

The source register contains 32 source groups, including 15 published opinions and one separately qualified unpublished opinion. This answer includes 48 claim entries, four worked models, 22 smaller postures, and 44 coverage entries. Repeated sections or alternate formats of the same authority are grouped rather than counted as independent corroboration.

Throughout, S001 means S_IA-P8-S001, and C001 means S_IA-P8-C001.

A. Classification, accrual, and the current-law qualification

A1. The 2026 compilation requires a later-enactment qualification

The published 2026 Code’s introductory language in §614.1 was amended by 2026 Iowa Acts chapter 1150, Senate File 512, approved June 2, 2026 and effective July 1, 2026. The amendment preserves existing law governing accrual—including discovery and related statutory or common-law doctrines—and provides that the specified time limitations may be altered only by an act of the General Assembly. It does not replace the ordinary five-, ten-, or twenty-year periods examined here. C001; S001–S003. Iowa Legislature+1

The act contains no separate transition paragraph resolving every pending or previously accrued claim. Iowa Code §4.5 supplies a presumption of prospective operation unless expressly retrospective. No post-July 1, 2026 controlling construction was located resolving every interaction between the new language, contractual limitation provisions, and equitable doctrines. The existing accrual doctrines should not be described as abolished; nor is every possible equitable extension certified unchanged. Iowa Legislature+1

A2. Classification and accrual matrix

The statutory periods and open-account rule are directly supported by §§614.1 and 614.5. The instrument and goods distinctions come from Iowa’s actual UCC text, not a model-code summary. Iowa Legislature+3

A3. Writing, signature, and proof are different questions

Matherly v. Hanson requires examination of whether the writings establish the obligation sued upon; a collection of papers does not become a written contract merely because some pages contain signatures or initials. Extrinsic evidence identifying a document or supplying incidental detail is different from oral evidence needed to create the essential obligation. C004; S015. Justia Law

Iowa’s electronic-transaction provisions recognize qualifying electronic records and signatures but preserve substantive law and attribution requirements. Their scope excludes most UCC transactions, including Article 3 transactions, except as otherwise provided by the specified statutory exceptions. Accordingly, this pass does not apply UETA indiscriminately to every electronic note. C005; S032. Iowa Legislature+2

The unpublished Gemini Capital Group v. New decision is useful only within those limits: its majority found the particular generic card agreement and other evidence insufficient to establish the written-contract category. It does not announce that every Iowa card debt has five years. Its citation status is separately qualified below. C006; S016. Justia Law

A4. Installments, acceleration, maturity, and cure

Frenzel distinguishes separately due installments from an unexercised acceleration option. Dunn demonstrates that contractual acceleration can also be affected by a course of accepting late payments. Neither supports treating every phrase containing “shall become due” as a self-executing acceleration regardless of the rest of the agreement. C010–C011; S022–S023. Justia Law+1

For transactions actually covered by Iowa Consumer Credit Code article 5, §§537.5109–.5110 impose additional default and cure conditions. Among the material branches are the payment-default threshold, required cure notice where a right to cure exists, a generally twenty-day post-notice restriction on acceleration/enforcement, and exceptions for specified prior notices and other circumstances. A premature money-judgment action can require dismissal without prejudice. C012; S005. Iowa Legislature+2

That does not establish that twenty days must simply be added to every installment limitation calculation. Transaction coverage, a valid notice, the particular obligation, and the legal effect on accrual must be established. Section 537.5111’s complete notice requirements were not analyzed here.

Charge-off, sale, collection placement, or a later demand is not automatically accrual. Those events may be evidence, but the legal trigger remains the applicable obligation’s breach, maturity, qualifying account item, or effective acceleration. C013.

A5. Burden and validity boundary

Limitations is ordinarily a defense requiring proper assertion; Rule 1.419 requires matters avoiding a pleading’s legal effect to be specifically pleaded. A creditor relying on revival must prove the qualifying facts; Schroedl’s later appeal specifically placed the revival issue on the claimant by a preponderance of the evidence. C016, C043. Iowa Legislature+1

A forged obligation, wrong-person account, released balance, discharged personal liability, or nonexistent debt presents a validity or enforceability issue, not a debt made valid by the passage of time. Conversely, uncertainty about validity does not itself establish a limitations defense. No actual obligation, authentic agreement, account balance, or assignment is supplied.

B. Acknowledgment, new promise, payment, and transfer

B1. Iowa’s statutory revival rule

Section 614.11 provides two routes for contract claims: a signed written admission by the party to be charged that the debt is unpaid, or a similarly signed written new promise to pay. The statute does not say that every payment revives the debt. C014–C018; S001. Iowa Legislature

Estate of Brooks rejects bare payment/oral-promise revival; Schroedl distinguishes payment from a qualifying written acknowledgment; Buttolph rejects reliance on the particular attorney-signed pleading and unilateral account entries before it. C015–C017. Justia Law+3

B2. Before expiry, after expiry, and resulting period

The revival doctrine is not confined to events before the original bar: the statute speaks of revival, and the Schroedl litigation expressly concerned an otherwise barred note. But a payment after expiry is still not sufficient by itself. C014–C018. Justia Law+1

For the written-note model below, a new ten-year calculation is shown only on the stipulated finding that an unconditional, effective §614.11 acknowledgment revives that same written-note claim from the acknowledgment date. This is not a universal rule that any letter concerning an oral debt creates a new ten-year contract. A conditional promise, novation, disputed identity, or future payment date can require a different analysis.

Settlement discussions are likewise not automatically revival, tolling, or estoppel. A signed communication might contain a sufficient acknowledgment, while a disputed or conditional offer might not. No categorical rule is drawn from the heading “settlement communication.”

B3. Assignment and debt sale

Rule 1.205 expressly preserves defenses against an assignor in cases outside the UCC, subject to its stated conditions. A purchaser’s payment to acquire a portfolio is not the consumer’s payment. Neither the sale date nor the purchaser’s acquisition price is a statutory acknowledgment by the debtor. C019; S006. Iowa Legislature

This does not establish chain of ownership, standing, admissibility, UCC holder status, or the amount transferred. It also does not mean assignment can never affect a statutory duration: the special rent-judgment assignment provision in §615.1A is an important counterexample discussed below.

B4. Bankruptcy is a separate boundary

Section 524’s discharge injunction and reaffirmation requirements are not displaced by Iowa revival doctrine. Voluntary repayment is permitted by §524(f), but voluntary repayment alone does not establish an enforceable reaffirmation. Section 524(e)’s treatment of other entities also prevents assuming that one debtor’s discharge resolves every co-obligor’s liability. C026. US Code

A bankruptcy distribution, trustee payment, or other involuntary application of money is not automatically the debtor’s signed acknowledgment. No actual discharge, reaffirmation, stay, or representative authority is supplied.

C. Borrowing, tolling, savings, and procedural preservation

C1. Choice of law and borrowing are not a shortest-period formula

Cameron v. Hardisty applies Iowa’s general forum-limitations approach while distinguishing substantive choice-of-law questions. Section 614.7 separately recognizes a complete foreign bar under its residency and non-Iowa-accrual conditions. It expressly excludes causes arising within Iowa. C020–C021. Justia Law+1

The necessary questions are separate:

No actual foreign jurisdiction, residence history, contract clause, or foreign-law body is supplied. Accordingly, this pass establishes the analytical gateway, not a universal shorter/longer-period selection.

C2. Tolling and related doctrines

Sources: §§614.4, .6, .8, .13; Kokenge; Downing; 11 U.S.C. §108(c); 50 U.S.C. §3936. Iowa Legislature+5

C3. Filing, service, savings, and relation back

Ordinary district-court commencement: Rule 1.301(1) uses filing of the petition to commence the action and determine the limitations commencement time. Small claims differs: §631.3 uses filing an original notice. Neither observation eliminates subsequent service requirements. C028. Iowa Legislature+1

Service: Rule 1.302(5) establishes a ninety-day service framework. After notice, the court may dismiss without prejudice or direct another time or manner of service; a showing of good cause requires an appropriate extension. Rucker applies good cause to its particular communications and conduct, not to every negotiation or inadvertent delay. C029. Iowa Legislature+1

Savings: Section 614.10 allows a qualifying second action within six months after failure of the first, except failure through negligence in prosecution. Furnald rejected the particular strategic voluntary dismissal; Trask, decided May 29, 2026, permitted savings where dismissal followed legal futility rather than negligent prosecution. “Without prejudice” is not synonymous with “automatically entitled to six more months.” C030. Iowa Legislature+2

Relation back: Rule 1.402(5) requires the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. Changing a defendant additionally requires the rule’s timely notice, lack of prejudice, and mistake-related knowledge conditions. Filing against the wrong person is not automatically repaired after expiry. C031. Iowa Legislature

Counting: Section 4.1(34), read with Rule 1.1801, excludes the first day and includes the last, with specified weekend, holiday, and clerk-closure treatment. Months are calendar months; years are twelve months. The models do not substitute thirty days for a month or assume every federal holiday is an Iowa statutory holiday. C032. Iowa Legislature+1

D. Judgment duration without collapsing the clocks

D1. Distinct legal objects

Sources: §§614.1(5)–(6), .3; §§624.23–.24, .37; §§626.2, .16, .27. Iowa Legislature+6

D2. “Renewal” must describe the actual mechanism

In Whitters, the Supreme Court rejected an attempted lien extension by motion and identified a separate action on the judgment as the route to obtaining a new lien. It did not create an automatic renewal entitlement or an evergreen judgment. C035–C037; S030. FindLaw Caselaw+1

The reviewed ordinary provisions did not establish a separate short dormancy period that automatically replaces the twenty-year framework. That is a bounded finding, not a certification covering every special judgment, stay, execution, or historical transition.

The current §614.3 text also retains a historical justice-of-the-peace judgment clause. It should not silently be rewritten as a rule governing all modern small claims.

D3. Assignment can matter in special judgment categories

Section 615.1A creates a material exception for rent judgments sold or assigned for value to certain third parties: the statute supplies a two-year period from original judgment entry, excluding specified stays, with the stated bank/credit-union exception. Its general rent-judgment and special-assignment branches must be read together. C039. Iowa Legislature

This defeats a universal statement that judgment assignment can never affect duration. It does not establish the treatment of any actual sale or old judgment; the pertinent 2013/2018 enactment-application history was not fully traced.

Sections 615.1–.3 contain other special secured-obligation restrictions. Those are identified as exclusions from the ordinary model, not analyzed as foreclosure or secured-debt merits.

D4. Satisfaction and actual ownership

A new owner must establish the rights actually transferred; assignment does not itself create a new judgment date. A new judgment does not authorize double collection of the same unpaid obligation.

Section 624.37’s full-satisfaction instrument and county filings address the public record. The statute also contains a request-based enforcement mechanism; this pass does not calculate penalties, interest, payoff amounts, or actual satisfaction. C040. Iowa Legislature

For a small-claims judgment ordering installments, §631.12 additionally restricts execution while payments comply and requires the specified default affidavit before enforcement. This is a payment/enforcement condition, not a new limitations period. C045. Iowa Legislature

D5. Federal collection and reporting boundaries

Regulation F: For an actor and debt covered by the rule, §1006.26 prohibits bringing or threatening legal action on time-barred debt. Its bankruptcy-proof-of-claim exception is express. It is not a universal rule governing every original creditor or every bankruptcy collection act. No withdrawn CFPB guidance is used; this finding rests on the operative regulation. C041. eCFR

FCRA: Collection/charge-off reporting ordinarily uses the delinquency immediately preceding collection or charge-off and the statutory seven-year/180-day structure, subject to statutory exceptions. It is not restarted merely by a debt sale or state-law acknowledgment. Civil-judgment reporting has different statutory wording, and actual bureau reporting practices were not investigated. C042. US Code

E. Source register, part 1 — statutes, rules, and enacted-law status

Common access record for every row: Freshly accessed October 27, 2026 PDT/UTC during the observed session identified above. Exact individual fetch times are not assigned. Selected bodies were read; “fresh” does not mean a complete chapter, amendment-chain, or citator audit.

E2. Primary case matrix and source register, part 2

Publication and read qualification: The following rows concern actual judicial opinion bodies, not publisher summaries. Justia and FindLaw are disclosed republication hosts. Except for the explicit unpublished row, these are published Iowa appellate opinions. No complete citator or later-law certificate is claimed. Historical statutory numbering is not substituted for the current sections.

Unpublished-opinion qualification

The retrieved December2025 appellate rule is 6.904(2)(a)(2). It permits unpublished opinions as persuasive reasoning, not controlling authority, and specifies docket/electronic-database citation and, when necessary, attachment requirements. Gemini is used only on that basis. No Westlaw number was verified or invented. No brief or court filing is being prepared. C046. Iowa Legislature

F. Four independently worked fictional models

Shared counting assumptions

These are fictional research models, not actual filing or payment recommendations.

Unless a branch says otherwise:

• Iowa law governs the stipulated ordinary claim.
• No discharge, fraud, release, special-sector rule, military period, disability, borrowing, or tolling applies.
• A calendar year is twelve months; a month is a calendar month.
• The triggering day is excluded and the terminal day included under the applicable counting rule.
• Listed weekday endpoints are assumed not to be statutory holidays or extraordinary clerk-closure days.
• Future endpoints assume unchanged relevant law.
• Dates are computed anniversaries under stipulated legal predicates, not a guarantee that the last instant is safe.

M01 — Signed writing versus oral/open-account/card alternatives

Stipulated written-note facts

A genuine, authenticated signed note qualifies as an Article3 time instrument. It requires three separately due installments:

Plain text

Installment 1 maturity: June 30, 2015
Installment 2 maturity: June 30, 2016
Final installment maturity: June 30, 2017

No acceleration occurs initially. Section554.3118(1)(a)’s day-after-maturity rule and the stipulated ten-year written-contract category apply.

Plain text

Installment 1:
June 30, 2015 + 1 day = July 1, 2015 accrual
July 1, 2015 + 10 calendar years = July 1, 2025, Tuesday

Installment 2:
June 30, 2016 + 1 day = July 1, 2016 accrual
July 1, 2016 + 10 calendar years = July 1, 2026, Wednesday

Final installment:
June 30, 2017 + 1 day = July 1, 2017 accrual
July 1, 2017 + 10 calendar years = July 1, 2027, Thursday

One missed installment does not, on these facts, make all three dates July1,2025. C003, C009–C010.

Effective-acceleration alternative

Assume the authentic agreement gives an enforceable option, all applicable cure/notice requirements have been satisfied, no waiver defeats it, and an effective election makes the previously unmatured balance due August3,2015.

Plain text

Accelerated maturity: August 3, 2015
Day-after accrual: August 4, 2015
Ten-year anniversary: August 4, 2025, Monday

This calculation concerns the accelerated unmatured balance. It does not silently restart an already accrued installment. If acceleration was ineffective, the original installment schedule remains the alternative requiring analysis. C011–C012.

Different-obligation alternatives

Plain text

Stipulated oral-contract accrual: July 1, 2015
Applicable period: 5 years
Computed anniversary: July 1, 2020, Wednesday

For a genuinely continuous unwritten open account with its last proved qualifying item on July1,2015, the same five-year arithmetic follows—but only after §614.5 classification is established.

For a card file containing generic unsigned terms, none of the above classifications is automatic. Missing authenticated terms or missing linkage to the debtor prevents selection of one asserted date.

Adverse branch: If a required cure notice was absent, the August acceleration date is not established. If the writings do not establish the contractual obligation, ten years is not established. The arithmetic remains correct only within its stipulated branch. Sources: S001, S004–S005, S015–S017, S022–S023. Iowa Legislature+2

M02 — Pre-expiry and post-expiry acknowledgment versus payment

Original obligation

Assume a genuine written note has established accrual on May6,2015.

Plain text

May 6, 2015 + 10 calendar years
= May 6, 2025, Tuesday

Branch A: qualifying pre-expiry acknowledgment

On May1,2025, the debtor personally signs an unconditional writing identifying the note and admitting it remains unpaid.

Assume a court finds §614.11 satisfied and a renewed ten-year period for that same written-note claim begins on that date.

Plain text

Effective acknowledgment: May 1, 2025
Stipulated renewed period: 10 years
Computed anniversary: May 1, 2035, Tuesday

Branch B: qualifying post-expiry acknowledgment

Instead, the same qualifying event occurs June5,2025, after the original anniversary.

Plain text

Original anniversary: May 6, 2025
Later acknowledgment: June 5, 2025

If statutory revival is established:
June 5, 2025 + 10 years = June 5, 2035, Tuesday

The legal predicate is actual statutory revival, not merely a later transaction. The model does not establish a new ten-year period for every acknowledgment of an oral obligation or a conditional future promise.

Branch C: no qualifying writing

The debtor makes a $25 payment after May6,2025 but signs no qualifying acknowledgment or promise.

Plain text

Bare payment alone:
No new endpoint established under the Iowa authorities read.
Original computed anniversary remains May 6, 2025.

A signed check or electronic payment record could present a different evidentiary question if its content and attribution amount to the required acknowledgment. The fact of payment alone is insufficient.

Non-debtor entries

Plain text

Collector account credit: $100
Debt purchaser's acquisition price: $200

Neither is stipulated to be money paid by the debtor, much less a signed admission by the party charged. No restart is calculated.

Adverse branches: An unauthorized family payment, an attorney’s disputed proposal, a conditional settlement offer, a writing referring to another debt, or a discharged obligation defeats the assumed simple revival calculation until the missing legal predicates are resolved. C014–C019, C026. Iowa Legislature+2

M03 — Borrowing, tolling, savings, filing, and service

These are separate alternatives, not cumulative additions to one clock.

Base Iowa branch

Plain text

Stipulated oral-contract accrual: July 15, 2020
Period: 5 calendar years
Base anniversary: July 15, 2025, Tuesday

Foreign-bar alternative

Assume—not as a finding about any actual jurisdiction—that:

• The cause arose outside Iowa.
• The defendant previously resided in the relevant foreign jurisdiction.
• Its applicable law fully bars this claim after four years.
• No foreign tolling, revival, or other exception applies.
• Section614.7 applies to the stipulated circumstances.

Plain text

July 15, 2020 + 4 years
= July 15, 2024, Monday

That foreign bar can matter even though the Iowa scalar date is July15,2025. Without those predicates, the four-year date is only a hypothetical comparison.

Statutory-prohibition alternative

Instead, retain Iowa’s five-year branch and stipulate an actual qualifying prohibition under §614.13 covering June1–June30,2025 inclusive, with no chapter exception.

Plain text

Excluded days: 30 calendar days
Base anniversary: July 15, 2025

July 16–July 31: 16 days
August 1–August 14: 14 days
Total added: 30 days

Adjusted computed endpoint: August 14, 2025, Thursday

Accrual remains July15,2020. The excluded period does not change the original accrual event.

Commencement/service alternative

Assume a regular district-court petition is filed July10,2025, before the unadjusted July15 anniversary.

Plain text

Service count begins after July 10:

July 11–31 = 21 days
August = 31 days; cumulative 52
September = 30 days; cumulative 82
October 1–8 = 8 days; cumulative 90

Ninetieth day: October 8, 2025, Wednesday

Service on October9 is outside that nominal period. The action is not automatically lost in every circumstance: Rule1.302(5)’s court-order and good-cause branches must be applied. But filing on July10 does not immunize negligent later service.

Savings alternative

Assume the timely first action legally fails on November3,2025 for a reason satisfying §614.10 and not negligent prosecution.

Plain text

November 3, 2025 + 6 calendar months
= May 3, 2026, Sunday

Assuming ordinary commencement counting applies
and the clerk is open on the next day:
Adjusted filing endpoint = May 4, 2026, Monday

This is not “180 days.” If the dismissal instead results from negligent prosecution, the model does not establish savings. A goods action may also invoke §554.2725’s differently worded savings provision.

Adverse branch: Actual foreign law, an inapplicable injunction, negligent service, or a different failure date changes the outcome. No silent switch among those branches is permitted. C020–C032, C044. Iowa Legislature+4

M04 — Entered judgment, lien, execution, and a new action

Original judgment

Assume an ordinary Iowa district-court money judgment of a court of record was rendered and properly entered on June2,2014. It is not a rent, support, marital-distribution, secured-obligation, or foreign-recognition judgment. No stay, discharge, satisfaction, or special exception applies.

Plain text

Nine-year point:
June 2, 2014 + 9 years = June 2, 2023, Friday

Ten-year original lien anniversary:
June 2, 2014 + 10 years = June 2, 2024, Sunday

Twenty-year judgment-action anniversary:
June 2, 2014 + 20 years = June 2, 2034, Friday

The Sunday lien anniversary is a fixed-duration question, not automatically a filing deadline extended to Monday. This model does not claim an extra day of lien existence.

Proper separate-action alternative

Assume the legally entitled judgment creditor commences a separate action on June5,2023, proves ownership and the unpaid judgment, complies with required process, and obtains a genuinely new judgment on October5,2023.

Plain text

New judgment date: October 5, 2023, Thursday

New lien anniversary, assuming proper attachment:
October 5, 2023 + 10 years = October 5, 2033, Wednesday

New judgment-action anniversary:
October 5, 2023 + 20 years = October 5, 2043, Monday

The new dates arise from the stipulated new judgment, not from filing a motion, recording a copy, selling the old judgment, or renewing a provider license. Actual priority and duplicate-recovery questions are not decided.

Adverse alternatives

• Only a “renewal” motion filed: Whitters does not permit that motion alone to extend the original lien.
• No new judgment obtained: The new October2023 dates do not exist.
• Assignment only: No new original judgment date is created.
• Full satisfaction: Remaining enforceability cannot be inferred from the twenty-year outer framework.
• Rent judgment assigned for value: §615.1A requires a separate analysis; this ordinary model cannot be reused.
• Original lien expired but judgment remains unbarred: The two objects remain distinct; actual execution and property rights need separate authority and facts.
• Individual writ: Its 120-day return framework is not a new twenty-year judgment period.

C033–C040. Iowa Legislature+3

G. Twenty-two smaller distinct postures

These postures are applications of the identified sources, not additional independent authorities or findings about real accounts.

H. Atomic claim register — S_IA-P8-C001–C048

“High” means strong support for the stated text or narrow holding—not certainty about an unidentified account. “Conditional” identifies a rule whose application requires missing facts.

I. Complete component coverage reconciliation

Status meaning: “Answered” means the identified general text or narrow holding is supported—not that any actual account is classified. “Partial” means material doctrine is established but an identified legal or factual issue remains. “Unresolved” is not an adverse conclusion. Exclusions remain required later work.

J. Scope and contribution crosswalk

The crosswalk is a scope record, not additional accepted coverage.

K. Researcher self-check and exact residual evidence gaps

Actual work performed

The public-law research freshly opened operative Iowa statutes, the relevant 2026 enacted amendment and official bill history, selected court-rule bodies, federal statutory/regulatory provisions, and the majority bodies identified in the case matrix.

Selected PDF pages were visually inspected, including the limitation provisions, enacted amendment, Iowa UCC sections, consumer-credit cure provisions, civil/appellate rules, judgment and execution provisions, small-claims sections, narrow electronic-record provisions, and the relevant pages of the available opinion PDFs. This does not claim visual inspection of every page of every chapter or opinion.

The four models were separately calculated using calendar-date arithmetic. No prior fee, funds, bond, or agreement example was rerun.

Failed or limited routes

• https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2026/614.html did not supply usable content; the official chapter PDF supplied the operative text.
• https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2026/614.3.pdf timed out; its complete provision was read in the chapter PDF.
• https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/rules/current/court/1.pdf failed; the official ACO chapter PDF and court-rule index supplied the selected text.
• https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2026/626.html failed; the official chapter PDF supplied the text.
• The Christy v. Miulli landing route did not produce a freshly read underlying majority body. It is not counted; Downing’s own holding is the source used.
• The underlying Burns opinion and the intermediate1966 Schroedl opinion were not recovered/read as independent primary evidence and are not counted merely because another opinion refers to them.

These failures are preserved as route limitations, not evidence that the law is absent.

Remaining legal research gaps

The most consequential unresolved legal issues are:

1. A modern controlling Iowa majority decision squarely classifying the full range of current credit-card/electronic-account records for §614.1 purposes.
2. The limitation consequences of a genuinely new, conditional promise or account-stated agreement after an earlier claim has become barred.
3. Modern ordinary-debt application of nonresidence tolling where the defendant remains amenable to service.
4. Full construction of the July1,2026 amendment in pending/pre-effective cases and disputed equitable-extension settings.
5. Actual foreign-law, contractual-choice, substantive-repose, and borrowing predicates.
6. Complete historical application of special rent-judgment amendments and other special judgment statutes.
7. Complete later court-rule and citator checks beyond the selected official bodies and bounded order review.

No source gap was filled with a guessed period, invented holding, assumed account document, or fabricated filing date.

What was not done

No actual borrower, creditor, provider, property, payment, account, assignment, judgment, court term, docket, or case-status record was searched. Published opinions were accessed as public legal authorities, not as investigations of their parties.

No filing, service, collection, reporting, payment, account change, contact, private-record request, browser control, local write, publication, or cross-chat action occurred. No hash verification, independent review, whole-state certification, full citator audit, or unseen-source verification is claimed.

Disposition: The requested limitation and judgment-duration component has substantive, sourced findings and explicit unresolved boundaries. It does not establish a safe payment date, filing date, valid debt, collectible judgment, provider permission, component acceptance, Iowa acceptance, parent acceptance, A066/A097/A098 acceptance, operational approval, or publication readiness.

END S_IA PASS-08