Which place’s debt rules apply—and who can help?

SettleADebt.com — S_KS, PASS-12

Kansas ordinary unsecured consumer-debt limitation, accrual, choice of law, tolling, and revival

Fresh research date: October 26, 2026, Pacific (America/Los_Angeles) / October 26, 2026, UTC Actual model: GPT-5.6 Sol Pro Review character: Same-project continuation in this original authorized Chat; not an independent review Component boundary: Ordinary unsecured written and unwritten consumer obligations, revolving and credit-card accounts, open and stated accounts, installment obligations, negotiable-note gateway classification, accrual, acceleration, revival, choice of law, borrowing, statutory tolling, commencement, and the narrow federal time-barred-debt overlay.

PASS-11 reporting is saved but unreviewed and is not adopted as a premise. Likewise, no new legal conclusion from PASS-05 through PASS-11 is assumed. The operative statutes and cases used here were read for this component.

This pass does not complete mortgage or foreclosure limitations, vehicle repossession or deficiency claims, medical-specific billing, utilities, rent, student debt, support, fines, government or tax debt, probate claims, bankruptcy procedure, sale-of-goods claims, fraud claims, judgments, liens, judgment renewal, garnishment, secured-credit remedies, local law, tribal law, or complete litigation procedure.

Executive determination

Kansas does not assign one limitations period to “consumer debt,” “collection accounts,” “credit cards,” or “debt buyers.” The governing period depends on the legal claim actually sued upon and the documents necessary to establish it:

• Five years generally applies to an action on an agreement, contract, or promise in writing, but only when the writings themselves contain the material contractual terms needed to establish the promise.
• Three years generally applies to an express or implied contractual obligation not in writing.
• A qualifying negotiable note is governed by the more specific Kansas UCC rule: ordinarily six years from the stated due date or valid accelerated due date; a demand note generally runs six years after demand, with a separate ten-year no-payment bar where no demand occurs.
• A revolving or credit-card account is not categorically three years or five years merely because it is called a “credit card.” The claimant must establish the actual claim: complete written contract, implied contract, account stated, or another recognized theory.
• Installments ordinarily accrue separately as each payment becomes due unless the contract validly accelerates the balance.
• Assignment, debt sale, collection placement, charge-off, cancellation of charging privileges, or a settlement offer does not itself create a new accrual date or restart the period.
• A qualifying part payment, signed written acknowledgment, or signed written promise can begin a new period under K.S.A. 60-520—even after the prior period has run—but only if the statutory and case-law predicates are met. A payment can be expressly limited to only part of the debt.
• Filing a petition is not always enough. To obtain the filing-date commencement benefit, service or publication generally must occur within 90 days, subject to the statutory extension and cure provisions.
• Limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense that can be waived. Expiration bars the judicial remedy; it does not extinguish the underlying obligation.
• A covered federal debt collector may not sue or threaten suit on a time-barred debt, but Regulation F does not prohibit every truthful, nonthreatening request for voluntary payment. (Kansas Legislature) (Kansas Legislature) (eCFR)

The central practical rule is therefore:

Plain text

Applicable deadline
= legally classified claim
+ legally supported accrual event
+ any valid acceleration or installment treatment
+ any valid revival
+ applicable tolling or borrowing rule
+ timely Kansas commencement

Neither the creditor’s label nor a spreadsheet’s “last payment date” can substitute for that analysis.

A. Claim-by-claim classification matrix

The five-year writing test is substantive, not cosmetic. In Miller v. William A. Smith Constructing Co., the Kansas Supreme Court held that the writing must be complete enough to establish all material terms without extrinsic proof supplying essential contract terms. A contract partly written and partly oral is treated as oral for limitations purposes. The writing need not be signed by every party if the complete writing is executed by the party charged and accepted and acted upon by the other side. Justia Law

A1. Written versus unwritten obligations

K.S.A. 60-511(1) provides five years for an action on an agreement, contract, or promise in writing. K.S.A. 60-512(1) provides three years for express or implied contractual obligations not in writing. The phrase “written contract” therefore does not mean merely that some paper or electronic records exist. The writings relied upon must establish the material promise sued upon. (Kansas Legislature) (Kansas Legislature)

Documents that can matter include:

• The signed application.
• Cardholder or loan agreement.
• Amendments and change-in-terms notices.
• Pricing or fee schedules.
• Statements.
• Records of use and acceptance.
• Any later written settlement or acknowledgment.

Statements showing charges and payments can prove account activity. They do not necessarily supply a missing contractual promise, governing terms, amendment authority, or due-date provision.

A2. Credit cards and revolving debt

No published controlling Kansas appellate decision located in this pass establishes that every credit-card action is governed by either three years or five years.

The most relevant publicly available Kansas examples point in different directions without creating a categorical rule:

• In unpublished CoreFirst Bank & Trust v. Tuckness, the district court applied the three-year period, and the Court of Appeals alternatively treated a later minimum payment as restarting that three-year period. But the appellant inadequately briefed the limitations issue, the opinion is unpublished, and its reference to “K.S.A. 60-250(a)” appears to be a citation error for K.S.A. 60-520. It is not a reliable published classification rule for all credit cards. FindLaw
• In unpublished First National Bank of Omaha v. Lucas, admissions, account use, and statements supported liability, but the decision did not decide whether three years or five years governed. Justia Law
• An official Kansas Courts search located unpublished Portfolio Recovery Associates v. Kimrey, where the parties agreed that the three-year unwritten-contract period applied. The official opinion page returned HTTP 403 in this session, so that decision is not used here as fully read substantive authority. Kansas Courts

The evidence-backed classification is therefore:

Plain text

Credit-card claim based on a complete written promise:
potentially 5 years

Credit-card claim requiring implied or oral terms:
potentially 3 years

Qualifying negotiable instrument:
specific Article 3 period

Account-stated claim:
classification depends on form of the stated-account agreement

A card issuer or debt buyer cannot select five years merely by attaching statements, and a consumer cannot establish three years merely by calling the account “open-ended.”

A3. Open accounts

Kansas does not supply a universal “open account” limitations period for all revolving debts. The Kansas Supreme Court’s specialized mutual-open-account doctrine requires a connected series of reciprocal debits and credits, a shifting balance, and an intention that individual entries not be independent but form one continuing liability to be fixed at settlement or the last pertinent entry. Justia Law

That is materially different from an ordinary account in which:

• One party advances credit.
• The consumer makes purchases.
• The consumer’s payments reduce only that consumer’s balance.
• The creditor never incurs reciprocal indebtedness to the consumer.

A recurring statement and repeated payments are therefore not enough, by themselves, to establish a mutual open running account.

A4. Account stated

An account stated is a new agreement fixing the balance arising from prior transactions, with an express or implied promise to pay. Assent can be inferred from circumstances, including retention without timely objection, but the existence of assent remains fact-dependent. Kansas authority expressly recognizes that the statement and assent need not be signed or entirely written. Justia Law

The resulting limitation branch is therefore not automatic:

An account statement mailed by the creditor does not become an account stated merely because it exists.

A5. Negotiable instruments

K.S.A. 84-3-118 is the specific limitations statute for instruments satisfying Article 3. A qualifying negotiable instrument generally must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount, be payable to bearer or order, be payable on demand or at a definite time, and not require additional undertakings beyond those permitted by statute. (Kansas Legislature)

For covered instruments:

• A definite-time note: six years after the stated due date or valid accelerated due date.
• A demand note: six years after demand.
• No demand on a demand note: barred after a continuous ten-year period during which neither principal nor interest was paid.
• Other drafts, checks, certificates of deposit, warranties, and conversion claims have their own subsection-specific periods. (Kansas Legislature)

A lender cannot assume that every written personal loan labeled “promissory note” receives six years. The instrument first must satisfy Article 3.

B. Accrual, installments, maturity, and acceleration

B1. General accrual rule

K.S.A. 60-510 says the prescribed period runs after the cause of action accrues. Kansas cases frame accrual as the point at which the claimant has a present right to maintain the action. A continuing commercial relationship or an account remaining administratively open does not delay accrual after an actionable breach has occurred. (Kansas Legislature) Justia Law

Events that may establish accrual

• Missed due date.
• Contractual maturity.
• Valid automatic acceleration.
• Completed exercise of optional acceleration.
• Demand on a demand instrument.
• Agreed account-stated balance.
• Final settlement or last pertinent entry of a true mutual open running account.

Events that do not automatically establish accrual

• Charge-off.
• Sale or assignment.
• Placement with a collection agency.
• Cancellation of future charging privileges.
• Internal “default” coding.
• Credit-report delinquency date.
• Settlement offer.
• Demand letter where the debt was already due.
• Last payment, unless the contract makes it the legally relevant breach or the payment validly revives the claim.

B2. Installment obligations

Absent valid acceleration, each matured installment generally gives rise to a separate cause of action when it becomes due and remains unpaid. Kansas appellate authority has stated the installment rule in other recurring-payment contexts, while Cornett v. Roth confirms the complementary proposition: where a note lacks an acceleration clause, an action for the entire principal before maturity is premature even though past-due installments or interest may be recoverable. Justia Law

Thus, for a five-year written installment contract:

Plain text

Installment 1 deadline = Installment 1 due date + 5 years
Installment 2 deadline = Installment 2 due date + 5 years
...
Final maturity claim   = Final maturity date + 5 years

The entire remaining balance does not acquire the first missed installment’s accrual date unless the contract and applicable law validly accelerate it.

B3. Automatic acceleration

Kansas recognizes clauses under which the entire balance becomes due automatically upon the defined default. If the language is absolute and contains no optional feature, no separate election is required. Justia Law

The necessary questions are:

1. What event does the clause define as default?
2. Is acceleration automatic or optional?
3. Was the clause waived or modified by course of performance?
4. Does a consumer-credit cure statute delay enforcement?
5. Did the creditor later accept performance inconsistent with acceleration?

An internal charge-off is not a substitute for an automatic-acceleration clause.

B4. Optional acceleration

Where acceleration is optional, Kansas authority requires more than a conditional future warning. The holder generally must:

1. Clearly and unequivocally state that it is exercising the acceleration option and demanding the whole balance; and
2. Take an affirmative act toward enforcement.

A notice saying the account will be accelerated in the future if the default is not cured is ordinarily a threat of future acceleration, not completed acceleration. Justia Law

Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Holverson involved a mortgage, so it does not itself decide every unsecured-credit contract. Its two-step construction of optional acceleration is nevertheless published Kansas appellate authority on Kansas contract law. Full mortgage treatment remains excluded.

B5. Waiver and deacceleration

Acceptance of late payments and other conduct can waive or modify enforcement of an acceleration clause. Foundation Property Investments recognizes that a party can retract a waiver prospectively with notice and a reasonable opportunity to perform, depending on the contract and facts. Justia Law

This pass did not locate controlling Kansas authority establishing a universal rule for:

• Deacceleration after a fully completed acceleration.
• Resetting limitations through unilateral deacceleration.
• Portfolio-level “deacceleration” coding.
• Revival of future installments after dismissal of a collection suit.

Those questions remain contract- and claim-specific.

B6. UCCC cure rights

For a covered Kansas UCCC consumer-credit transaction payable in installments:

• A payment default must continue for ten days before the creditor may send the statutory cure notice.
• For a default consisting only of failure to make a required payment, the creditor may not accelerate or repossess until 20 days after giving the cure notice.
• Timely cure restores the consumer’s contractual rights as though the payment defaults had not occurred.
• After one cure notice on the same obligation, the statute supplies no additional cure right for later defaults. (Kansas Legislature)

Therefore, a purported acceleration date cannot be accepted without checking:

• Whether the transaction falls within the UCCC.
• Whether the default was only missed payment.
• Whether a cure notice was required.
• When it was given.
• Whether the cure period expired.
• Whether the consumer cured.
• Whether a prior cure notice had already exhausted the right.

The UCCC does not itself create a new universal limitations period for ordinary consumer-credit claims; it can change when acceleration becomes legally enforceable.

B7. Assignment, sale, and charge-off

Neither K.S.A. 60-510 nor K.S.A. 60-520 identifies assignment, sale, servicing transfer, collection placement, or charge-off as an accrual or revival event.

Absent a new enforceable contract, novation, valid acknowledgment, or payment:

Plain text

Assignment date ≠ new breach date
Debt-sale date  ≠ new accrual date
Charge-off date ≠ automatic acceleration date
Collector intake date ≠ new limitations period

The assignee acquires the existing claim subject to the existing classification, accrual history, defenses, and applicable borrowing rules. The assignee’s identity cannot improve the limitations position merely through transfer.

C. Revival, acknowledgment, and new promises

C1. Current statutory rule

K.S.A. 60-520 recognizes three distinct events in a contract case:

1. Payment of any part of principal or interest.
2. Acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt, or claim.
3. Promise to pay it.

After a qualifying event, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for that claim, measured from the payment, acknowledgment, or promise. A separate acknowledgment or promise must be in writing and signed by the party charged. Payment need not itself be embodied in a signed writing. (Kansas Legislature)

This is more accurately described as revival or recommencement, not a mere pause of the old clock.

C2. Payment predicates

A payment does not restart the period merely because the creditor’s ledger contains a credit. Kansas authority requires circumstances showing that:

• The payment was made by the obligor or someone acting at the obligor’s direction.
• It was actually applied as part payment of the obligation in question.
• The circumstances acknowledge a present existing liability.
• For another joint debtor, the statutory authority, knowledge and consent, or ratification requirements are satisfied. Justia Law

Potentially insufficient events include:

• Creditor’s unilateral accounting credit.
• Unauthorized third-party payment.
• Involuntary seizure or garnishment.
• Payment clearly designated for a different account.
• Refund, reversal, promotional credit, or bookkeeping adjustment.
• Payment accompanied by a complete denial that any further amount is owed.

Actual authorization and intent remain factual issues.

C3. Payment can revive a time-barred debt

A valid payment can revive a claim even after the original limitations period has expired. The final Kansas Supreme Court decision in O’Malley v. Frazier involved a time-barred written promissory note and a later $5,000 principal payment. FindLaw

But O’Malley also establishes an important limitation: a payment may be expressly qualified. Because the makers consistently acknowledged principal but disavowed interest, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the payment revived the remaining principal but not the barred interest. The Supreme Court reversed the broader Court of Appeals ruling that payment necessarily revived the entire note. FindLaw

Accordingly:

This is why “any payment restarts the clock” is materially overbroad.

C4. Written acknowledgment or promise

A nonpayment acknowledgment or promise must be:

• In writing.
• Signed by the party to be charged.
• Attributable to that person.
• Acknowledgment of a present existing debt or a promise to pay it.
• Sufficiently distinct and unequivocal under Kansas case law.

An oral statement alone—such as “I intend to pay someday”—does not satisfy the signed-writing branch. An oral statement accompanying an actual part payment can, however, qualify or limit the payment’s effect under O’Malley. FindLaw

C5. Electronic acknowledgment

Kansas UETA provides that an electronic record can satisfy a writing requirement and an electronic signature can satisfy a signature requirement, but only where the parties agreed to transact electronically and the signature or record is attributable to the purported signer. (Kansas Legislature) (Kansas Legislature)

An email, text, portal click, or typed name therefore does not automatically revive a debt. Relevant evidence includes:

• Whether the parties agreed to transact electronically.
• Whether the communication was authored or adopted by the consumer.
• Whether the typed name or process was used with intent to sign.
• Whether the communication acknowledges the debt rather than disputes it.
• Whether the amount or obligation can be identified.
• Whether the promise is conditional.
• Whether an agent had authority.

C6. Settlement negotiations

A settlement offer, request for information, or statement made during negotiations is not automatically:

• A qualifying part payment.
• A signed acknowledgment of present liability.
• An unconditional promise to pay.
• A waiver of the limitations defense.

The exact language and accompanying conduct control. A conditional proposal such as “I will pay $500 only if this fully settles every claim” does not necessarily acknowledge the unpaid remainder. O’Malley confirms that qualifications accompanying payment matter. FindLaw

C7. Revival and negotiable instruments

K.S.A. 60-520 applies to cases founded on contract, but K.S.A. 84-3-118 supplies specific periods for negotiable instruments. No controlling Kansas case located in this pass comprehensively reconciles current §60-520 revival with every subsection of §84-3-118.

Accordingly:

• This pass does not assume that every revived negotiable note receives five years.
• The instrument must first be classified.
• The exact applicable “period prescribed for the same” should be tested against Article 3.
• The examples below use ordinary written or unwritten contractual obligations unless expressly identified as negotiable instruments.

D. Choice of law, borrowing, tolling, and savings

D1. Kansas forum treatment of limitations

Kansas generally treats statutes of limitation as procedural. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Kansas could constitutionally apply its own limitations period to claims whose substantive law came from another state because Kansas had long treated limitation periods as procedural. The official U.S. Reports PDF was read at printed page 717/PDF index 0 and printed page 722/index 5. GovInfo+1

That does not eliminate Kansas’s borrowing statute or a valid express contractual limitations selection. It establishes the forum-law baseline.

D2. Generic choice-of-law clauses

Western Video Collectors v. Mercantile Bank holds that a generic clause saying another state’s “law” governs ordinarily imports substantive law, not that state’s limitations period. The foreign limitations rule applies by agreement only when the parties expressly select it. Justia Law

Outside a covered UCCC transaction:

D3. Kansas UCCC choice restrictions

For consumer-credit transactions to which the Kansas UCCC applies, current K.S.A. 16a-1-201(7), effective January 1, 2025, invalidates consumer agreements selecting:

• Another state’s law.
• Another state’s jurisdiction.
• A fixed venue,

except for the narrow nonresident-consumer branch in subsection (3). (Kansas Legislature)

Thus, even an express foreign-limitations clause may fail where it is embedded in a covered Kansas UCCC consumer-credit agreement.

D4. Kansas borrowing statute

K.S.A. 60-516 provides that when a cause of action arises in another state or country and is barred there, it is also barred in Kansas. The exception protects a Kansas resident who held the cause of action from the time it accrued. (Kansas Legislature)

The rule is asymmetric:

Plain text

Foreign claim already barred where it arose:
generally barred in Kansas

Foreign jurisdiction supplies a longer period:
Kansas does not automatically borrow the longer period

Kansas resident held claim from accrual:
statutory exception may apply

In Green v. Kensinger, the Kansas Supreme Court treated the place where the claimant first had a right to sue as material to where the claim arose; the mere place where the underlying transaction began was not automatically controlling. Justia Law

A debt buyer’s current headquarters or acquisition location does not necessarily become the place of accrual.

D5. Absence and concealment

K.S.A. 60-517 can exclude time during which the defendant is out of Kansas, has absconded, or is concealed. But the statute expressly denies that extension where the defendant’s whereabouts are known and service can be made under Kansas’s service provisions. (Kansas Legislature)

Modern long-arm and out-of-state service often make physical absence insufficient. Actual location and service availability matter.

D6. Legal disability

K.S.A. 60-515 can extend certain nonpenalty claims for:

• A person under 18.
• An incapacitated person.
• A qualifying prisoner lacking court access.

The person generally receives one year after removal of the disability, subject to the statute’s eight-year outer limit from the act giving rise to the claim. The provision concerns the person entitled to bring the action; in an ordinary creditor claim, consumer disability ordinarily does not enlarge the creditor’s period merely because the consumer is a minor or incapacitated. (Kansas Legislature)

D7. Savings statute

If a timely action fails otherwise than on the merits after the original period has expired, K.S.A. 60-518 can allow a new action within six months. The result depends on:

• Whether the first action was timely.
• Whether it failed otherwise than on the merits.
• Whether the second action asserts the same claim in the legally required sense.
• Whether another statute displaces the savings rule. (Kansas Legislature)

A voluntary dismissal or service failure is not assumed to qualify without the actual procedural record.

D8. Injunction tolling

K.S.A. 60-519 excludes from the limitations period time during which commencement of the action is stayed by an injunction. (Kansas Legislature)

No general equitable-tolling doctrine for all consumer-debt claims was established in the sources reviewed.

D9. Bankruptcy stay

11 U.S.C. §108(c) provides that where nonbankruptcy law fixes a period for commencing a civil action against the debtor and the period had not expired before the bankruptcy filing, the deadline is the later of:

1. The end of the nonbankruptcy period, including any suspension; or
2. Thirty days after notice of termination or expiration of the stay. (U.S. Code)

Kansas appellate authority has treated the automatic stay as an injunction for K.S.A. 60-519 purposes in the context considered there, thereby incorporating a state-law suspension into §108(c)’s first branch. Justia Law

This does not authorize double counting. The calculation requires:

• Petition date.
• Whether the claim was still alive.
• Stay scope.
• Stay termination or expiration.
• Notice date.
• Any Kansas suspension.
• Any discharge or injunction affecting enforceability.

Full bankruptcy procedure remains excluded.

E. Commencement, assertion, waiver, and time-barred collection

E1. Filing plus service

Under K.S.A. 60-203:

• A civil action is commenced at filing if service or publication occurs within 90 days.
• The court can extend that period by 30 days upon good cause.
• If service occurs later without a qualifying extension, commencement is the service date.
• Where attempted service is later adjudicated invalid, the statute provides a separate cure period after that adjudication, subject to its conditions. (Kansas Legislature)

In Le v. Joslin, the Kansas Court of Appeals applied this rule and rejected the idea that the defendant’s actual knowledge substituted for timely legal service. Justia Law

A petition filed on the last day can therefore still become untimely if service is not completed within the relation-back period.

E2. Computing terminal days

K.S.A. 60-206 applies when a Kansas statute does not specify another computation method:

• Exclude the triggering day.
• Count every intermediate day, including weekends and legal holidays.
• Extend a terminal Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday to the next nonholiday.
• Apply the statute’s legal-holiday definition. (Kansas Legislature)

Court closure and filing-hour issues require actual court facts and are not assumed in the examples.

E3. Affirmative defense and waiver

K.S.A. 60-208(c) lists statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Kansas appellate authority has held that the defense can be waived if not pleaded and that a trial court cannot simply inject it sua sponte in circumstances where it was not properly raised. (Kansas Legislature) Justia Law

This does not mean a court must ignore an obvious time bar in every procedural setting. Pleading, amendment, default, jurisdiction, and special statutory rules remain later litigation questions.

E4. Expiration does not extinguish the debt

Kansas cases describe limitation as barring the remedy rather than extinguishing the underlying obligation. Some older decisions use “repose” terminology, but they do not treat expiration as satisfaction or discharge of the debt. Justia Law+1

Consequences include:

• A valid voluntary payment can still be made.
• The obligation can potentially be revived under K.S.A. 60-520.
• A time-barred claim is not the same as a paid, forgiven, discharged, or nonexistent debt.
• Federal law can prohibit suit or threats by covered debt collectors even though the obligation persists.

E5. Federal time-barred-debt overlay

Regulation F defines a time-barred debt by reference to the applicable limitations law. A federal FDCPA debt collector may not bring or threaten a legal action to collect it. Filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy is excluded from that particular prohibition. (eCFR)

The rule applies only when:

• The obligation is a federal consumer “debt.”
• The actor is a federal “debt collector.”
• The applicable state-law period has expired.
• The communication or conduct constitutes suit or a threat of suit.

It does not categorically prohibit:

• A truthful statement that payment is voluntary.
• A nonthreatening settlement request.
• Accepting a voluntary payment.
• Every original-creditor communication.

The applicable-law calculation must be completed before labeling a debt time-barred. (U.S. Code)

No general Kansas statute requiring a time-barred-debt disclosure in every voluntary collection communication was verified in this pass.

F. Accrual and process matrix

G. Bounded worked examples

All examples are hypothetical. They do not establish debt validity, fee or interest authorization, ownership, proper notice, actual accrual, or permission to sue. No actual consumer, provider, account, contract, or court record is used.

G1. Same breach, written versus unwritten classification

Assumptions

• Cause of action accrues January 3, 2022.
• No revival, tolling, acceleration dispute, borrowing rule, bankruptcy, or special statute.
• Kansas forum and ordinary computation apply.

Branch A — Complete written agreement

Plain text

Accrual date                           January 3, 2022
Applicable period                      5 years
Fifth anniversary                      January 3, 2027
January 3, 2027                        Sunday
Terminal day under K.S.A. 60-206       Monday, January 4, 2027

Branch B — Unwritten or implied obligation

Plain text

Accrual date                           January 3, 2022
Applicable period                      3 years
Third anniversary                      January 3, 2025
January 3, 2025                        Friday
Terminal day                           January 3, 2025

The arithmetic is reliable only after the claim is correctly classified.

G2. Credit-card classification held

Hypothetical facts

• Issuer has statements and proof of card use.
• The signed application is available.
• The operative cardholder agreement and several amendments are missing.
• Statements contain the balance but not every governing contractual term.

Branches

Result: No terminal date can be calculated merely from the last statement or charge-off date.

G3. Installments versus acceleration

Hypothetical facts

• Written unsecured installment contract.
• Installments due January 1, February 1, and March 1, 2022.
• Five-year written-contract branch assumed.
• No revival or tolling.

Branch A — No acceleration

Plain text

January installment deadline   January 1, 2027, subject to holiday/weekend adjustment
February installment deadline  February 1, 2027
March installment deadline     March 1, 2027

Future installments keep their own maturity dates.

Branch B — Automatic acceleration on March 1, 2022

If the clause is absolute and the March default satisfies it:

Plain text

Full accelerated balance accrual     March 1, 2022
Nominal five-year anniversary         March 1, 2027

Branch C — Optional acceleration

If the creditor sends a conditional cure notice April 1 but does not clearly elect and affirmatively enforce acceleration until May 15:

Plain text

Conditional notice date               April 1, 2022
Completed optional acceleration       May 15, 2022
Potential full-balance accrual        May 15, 2022

A covered UCCC cure period could alter that result. The contract and notices are indispensable.

G4. Assignment without new promise

Assumptions

• Written unsecured contract breached June 30, 2021.
• Claim accrued that date.
• Debt sold September 1, 2023.
• No payment, acknowledgment, novation, tolling, or acceleration issue.

Plain text

Original accrual                   June 30, 2021
Debt-sale date                     September 1, 2023
New accrual caused by sale         None
Five-year anniversary              June 30, 2026

The purchaser receives the existing claim; the sale does not move the deadline to 2028.

G5. Valid part payment after the old period expired

Assumptions

• Ordinary nonnegotiable written contract.
• Original five-year period has expired.
• Debtor voluntarily makes a qualifying payment on May 10, 2024.
• Payment is authorized, attributable, and unqualified.
• No tolling or special statute.

Plain text

Revival event                      May 10, 2024
Applicable restarted period        5 years
New anniversary                    May 10, 2029
May 10, 2029                       Thursday

Qualified payment branch

If the payment is delivered with an express statement:

“This payment acknowledges principal only; I deny all interest.”

Under O’Malley, principal may be revived while barred interest remains barred, depending on the proven circumstances.

Invalid ledger-credit branch

If the creditor merely posts a $100 internal adjustment without consumer authorization:

Plain text

Qualifying consumer payment        Not established
Revival                            Not established

G6. Signed electronic acknowledgment

Hypothetical facts

• Original ordinary written debt.
• On November 30, 2023, the consumer sends an authenticated e-signed message: “I acknowledge that I currently owe $4,000 and promise to pay it.”
• Parties had agreed to transact electronically.
• Authorship and signature intent are established.
• No qualification, dispute, or agency issue.

Plain text

Potential acknowledgment date      November 30, 2023
Underlying prescribed period       5 years
Potential new anniversary          November 30, 2028

If the message is an unsigned inquiry—“Please explain why you say I owe $4,000”—it does not establish the same acknowledgment.

G7. Cross-border branch

Hypothetical facts

• Claim first became actionable in State X.
• State X barred the claim on September 1, 2025.
• Creditor was not a Kansas resident continuously holding the claim from accrual.
• Suit is later filed in Kansas.

Plain text

Foreign bar date                   September 1, 2025
Kansas borrowing consequence       Claim generally barred in Kansas

Kansas-resident-holder branch

If the claimant was a Kansas resident holding the claim from accrual, K.S.A. 60-516’s resident exception may preserve resort to Kansas’s own period.

Generic choice clause

A clause stating only “State X law governs” ordinarily does not import State X’s limitation under Western Video. A covered Kansas UCCC transaction may invalidate the foreign-law clause altogether.

G8. Negotiable demand note

Demand made

Assumptions

• Instrument qualifies as a negotiable demand note.
• Valid demand made June 15, 2022.
• No payment, tolling, or other subsection applies.

Plain text

Demand date                        June 15, 2022
Applicable period                  6 years
Sixth anniversary                  June 15, 2028
June 15, 2028                      Thursday

No demand

If no demand is made, the action is barred after a continuous ten-year period with no principal or interest payment. The exact beginning cannot be calculated without the instrument’s issue history and last payment.

G9. Last-day filing and service relation

Assumptions

• Claim’s adjusted terminal filing date is Monday, January 4, 2027.
• Petition is filed that day.
• No good-cause extension is initially requested.
• Ordinary K.S.A. 60-203 and 60-206 apply.

Plain text

Filing/event date                  January 4, 2027
Day 1 of service period            January 5, 2027
Day 90                             April 4, 2027
April 4, 2027                      Sunday
Adjusted service deadline          Monday, April 5, 2027

If valid service occurs April 5, commencement relates back to January 4.

If service occurs later and no statutory extension or invalid-service cure applies, commencement ordinarily becomes the actual service date, potentially making the action untimely.

G10. Bankruptcy suspension

Assumptions

• Claim is alive when bankruptcy begins.
• Exactly 100 days remain under nonbankruptcy law.
• Automatic stay lasts 240 days.
• Kansas treats the stay as an injunction suspending the state period.
• Stay-termination notice is received the day the stay ends.
• No discharge or other injunction bars the action.

Plain text

Time remaining at petition                  100 days
State-law suspended interval                240 days
Remaining period after stay ends            100 days
Federal minimum after notice                 30 days

Later of the two                            100 days after stay ends

The 240-day suspension is not added again after already preserving the 100 unused days. If notice of stay termination occurs later, the §108(c)(2) branch must be recalculated.

H. Source register

I. Claim register

J. Granular coverage and gap table

K. Researcher self-check

Actually read or inspected in PASS-12

• Current K.S.A. 60-510, 60-511, and 60-512.
• Current K.S.A. 60-515 through 60-520.
• Current K.S.A. 60-203, 60-206, and 60-208(c).
• Current K.S.A. 84-3-104, 84-3-108, and 84-3-118.
• Current K.S.A. 16a-1-201, 16a-5-109, and 16a-5-111.
• Current Kansas UETA electronic-assent, signature, and attribution provisions.
• Current 11 U.S.C. §108(c).
• Current 15 U.S.C. §1692a and 12 C.F.R. §1006.26 with relevant commentary.
• The complete materially relevant passages from:*Miller v. William A. Smith Constructing Co.Western Video Collectors v. Mercantile BankWortman v. Sun OilBonicamp v. McNeelyCornett v. RothFoundation Property Investments v. CTPWilmington Savings v. Holverson*Final Kansas Supreme Court decision in O’Malley v. FrazierFisher v. PendletonHustead v. BendixDaniels Trucking v. RogersGreen v. KensingerSt. Joseph Development v. SequenziaLe v. JoslinO’Donnell v. FletcherBomud Co. v. Yockey Oil**In re Estate of WernetUnpublished CoreFirst v. TucknessUnpublished First National Bank of Omaha v. Lucas
• The official U.S. Reports PDF for Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, including visual inspection of printed pages 717 and 722.

Material correction identified during this pass

The final Kansas Supreme Court decision in O’Malley v. Frazier reversed the Court of Appeals’ broader revival result. It held that the particular part payment revived principal but not disavowed interest. Any research relying only on the 2001 Court of Appeals decision would overstate the effect of partial payment. FindLaw

Access failures and source limitations

• Official Kansas Courts pages for O’Malley, CoreFirst, and Portfolio Recovery Associates v. Kimrey returned HTTP 403 when directly opened.
• The final O’Malley opinion was fully read through a public opinion reproduction.
• CoreFirst was fully read through a public opinion reproduction and treated as unpublished.
• Kimrey was located through the official search result, but the full opinion was not accessible and was not used for substantive findings.
• Most older Kansas cases were read through public reproductions rather than official court PDFs.
• No subscription citator, unpublished trial-court database, private docket, or records request was used.
• No complete subsequent-history audit was performed for every older case.

Not read, obtained, or established

• Any actual cardholder agreement, note, installment contract, account statement, cure notice, acceleration notice, assignment, settlement, payment authorization, service return, bankruptcy docket, or foreign-state statute.
• A complete Kansas trial-court or unpublished appellate survey.
• A published Kansas appellate decision categorically classifying every credit-card debt.
• A comprehensive Kansas decision reconciling K.S.A. 60-520 with every category in K.S.A. 84-3-118.
• A universal Kansas deacceleration rule for unsecured debt.
• Every equitable-tolling doctrine or claim-specific estoppel theory.
• Sale-of-goods, medical, rent, utility, education, government, tax, probate, secured-debt, judgment, or garnishment limitations.
• Any filing, contact, account action, provider lookup, court submission, records request, purchase, private data, website change, publication, Chrome control, other Chat, or security workaround.

Numeric self-check

The dated examples were independently checked for day-of-week and arithmetic consistency:

• January 3, 2027 is Sunday; extension to Monday, January 4, 2027.
• Ninety days after January 4, 2027, excluding the filing day, is Sunday, April 4, 2027; extension to Monday, April 5, 2027.
• May 10, 2029 is Thursday.
• June 15, 2028 is Thursday.
• June 30, 2026 is Tuesday.

The examples assume no conflicting court closure, special computation rule, tolling, revival, or service defect.

Method limits

• Debt labels did not select the period.
• Credit-card statements were not treated as a complete written contract without examining material terms.
• “Open account” was not converted into a universal three-year rule.
• A note label was not treated as proof of negotiability.
• Charge-off, sale, and collection placement were not treated as new accrual dates.
• Last payment was not treated as automatic accrual or automatic revival.
• Partial payment was not treated as necessarily reviving the entire balance.
• A typed email was not treated as a signed acknowledgment without UETA predicates.
• A generic choice-of-law clause was not treated as importing foreign limitations.
• Filing was not treated as sufficient without the K.S.A. 60-203 service analysis.
• Reporting eligibility was not treated as suit eligibility.
• Expiration was not treated as debt discharge.
• No individualized terminal date, permission to sue, obligation to pay, debt validity, ownership, recovery, operational clearance, component acceptance, Kansas acceptance, parent-dossier acceptance, A066 acceptance, or publication readiness is supplied.

PASS-12 conclusion

Kansas ordinary unsecured consumer-debt limitations are claim-specific. Five years applies only when the claimant can establish the material promise through adequate writings; three years applies to contractual obligations not in writing; and negotiable instruments have their own more specific periods. Credit cards, revolving accounts, “open accounts,” and account-stated claims require actual classification rather than a debt-type chart.

Accrual normally follows the legally enforceable breach, installment due date, maturity, demand, or valid acceleration—not charge-off, debt sale, or collector placement. Revival can occur through a qualifying payment or signed acknowledgment, even after expiration, but Kansas’s controlling O’Malley decision permits a payment to be expressly limited to only part of the debt. Cross-border claims require both Kansas’s forum rules and its borrowing statute; covered Kansas UCCC contracts generally cannot select foreign law or venue. A timely petition still requires timely valid service, and limitations ordinarily remains an affirmative, waivable defense that bars the remedy without extinguishing the obligation.

END S_KS PASS-12.